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ABSTRACT 
 
A major flaw of the book is its failure to note Wittgenstein’s role in destroying the 
mechanical or reductionist or computationalist view of mind. These continue to 
dominate cognitive science and philosophy, in spite of the fact that they were 
powerfully countered by W and later by Searle and others. 
 
There is much talk of W’s use of terms like “grammar”, “rules” etc. but never a clear 
mention that they mean our Evolved Psychology or our genetically programmed 
innate behavior. There are references to Baker and Hacker's works and to Malcolm 
Budd, but none to many standard W refs such as ter Hark, Johnston, and especially 
to the searchable Intelex CDROM and online sites of his complete works, nor to 
Searle, and none to the vast literature of evolutionary psychology.  
 
Many sections of the book are reasonably successful in describing W’s work but 
there is much aimless wandering and many mistakes and confusions. These will 
hopefully be obvious to those who read the above and my other reviews as I cannot 
recount more than a few of the hundreds of critical comments I made in my two 
readings of this book. A major flaw, common to most writing in the behavioral 
sciences, is the lack of awareness of the S1/S2 two selves or two systems of thought 
mode of describing personality that W pioneered (though nobody noticed) and a 
failure to be clear about nature/nuture issues. The fast, automatic perceptions, 
‘rules’ and behaviors of S1 are mushed together with the slow conscious 
dispositional thinking, believing and rule following of S2 and neither are clearly or 
consistently distinguished from arbitrary cultural behaviors. 
 
Like all authors until very recently, they fail to give Wittgenstein’s last work “On 
Certainty” the prominent position it deserves, and likewise fail to take advantage 
of the powerful dual systems of thought framework. Nor have they adopted the 
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useful extensions of Wittgenstein’s work made by John Searle. So, I first lay out a 
framework for intentionality (behavior) and then provide some detailed comments.   
This book is a reasonable first attempt to bring W’s pioneering work on higher order 
thought to the attention of psychology but it has many failings and needs a 
thorough rewrite. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from 
the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of 
Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John 
Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking 
Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed 
Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal Utopian 
Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). 
 
 
 
 Before remarking on “Wittgenstein and Psychology”, I will first offer some 
comments on philosophy and its relationship to contemporary psychological 
research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S) and Wittgenstein (W). It will help 
to see my reviews of PNC (Philosophy in a New Century), TLP, PI, OC, Making the 
Social World (MSW) and other books by and about these two geniuses, who provide 
a clear description of higher order behavior, not found in psychology books, that I 
will refer to as the WS framework. 
 
"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a 
"young science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its 
beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set theory.) For 
in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the 
other case, conceptual confusion and methods of proof). The existence of the 
experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems 
that trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by." Wittgenstein (PI 
p.232) 
 
 “Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This 
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tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete 
darkness.” (Blue Book p18, 1933).  
   
 
"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor 
do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited 
background against which I distinguish between true and false." Wittgenstein OC 
94 
 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the 
activities of the mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" p6 (1933) 
 
 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops anyway." 
Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
 
 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which 
corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the 
sentence ..." Wittgenstein CV p10 (1931) 
 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the reach 
of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological reality... 
Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not consciously 
experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological illusion." Searle PNC 
p115-117 
 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in an 
intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always 
determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything 
sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all intentionality 
is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
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"But you cannot explain a physical system such as a typewriter or a brain by 
identifying a pattern which it shares with its computational simulation, because the 
existence of the pattern does not explain how the system actually works as a 
physical system. ...In sum, the fact that the attribution of syntax identifies no further 
causal powers is fatal to the claim that programs provide causal explanations of 
cognition... There is just a physical mechanism, the brain, with its various real 
physical and physical/mental causal levels of description." Searle Philosophy in a 
New Century(PNC) p101-103 
 
 
"In short, the sense of `information processing' that is used in cognitive science is at 
much too high a level of abstraction to capture the concrete biological reality of 
intrinsic intentionality...We are blinded to this difference by the fact that the same 
sentence `I see a car coming toward me,' can be used to record both the visual 
intentionality and the output of the computational model of vision...in the sense of 
`information' used in cognitive science, it is simply false to say that the brain is an 
information processing device." Searle PNC p104-105 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people erroneously 
suppose that every mental representation must be consciously thought...but the 
notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and not an ontological 
notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can succeed or fail in a way 
that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a representation of its 
conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of the intentionality of 
social phenomena by analyzing their conditions of satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-
32 
"Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding the 
solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it 
were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything. ---Not anything that 
follows from this, no this itself is the solution! .... This is connected, I believe, with 
our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the solution of the difficulty is a 
description, if we give it the right place in our considerations. If we dwell upon it, 
and do not try to get beyond it." Zettel p312-314 
 
 
These quotes are not chosen at random but (along with the others in my reviews) 
are an outline of behavior (human nature) from our two greatest descriptive 
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psychologists. In considering these matters we must keep in mind that philosophy 
is descriptive psychology.  
 
Here is how the leading Wittgenstein scholar summarized his work: “Wittgenstein 
resolved many of the deep problems that have dogged our subject for centuries, 
sometimes indeed for more than two millennia, problems about the nature of 
linguistic representation, about the relationship between thought and language, 
about solipsism and idealism, self-knowledge and knowledge of other minds, and 
about the nature of necessary truth and of mathematical propositions. He ploughed 
up the soil of European philosophy of logic and language. He gave us a novel and 
immensely fruitful array of insights into philosophy of psychology. He attempted 
to overturn centuries of reflection on the nature of mathematics and mathematical 
truth. He undermined foundationalist epistemology. And he bequeathed us a 
vision of philosophy as a contribution not to human knowledge, but to human 
understanding – understanding of the forms of our thought and of the conceptual 
confusions into which we are liable to fall.”—Peter Hacker--'Gordon Baker's late 
interpretation of Wittgenstein' 
 
To this I would add that W was the first to clearly and extensively describe the two 
systems of thought--fast automatic prelinguistic S1 and the slow reflective linguistic 
dispositional S2. He explained how behavior only is possible with a vast inherited 
background that is the axiomatic basis for judging and cannot be doubted or judged, 
so will (choice), consciousness self, time and space are innate true-only axioms.  He 
noted in thousands of pages and hundreds of examples how our inner mental 
experiences are not directly describable in language, this being possible only with 
terms that substitute for public behavior (the impossibility of private language). He 
invented truth tables and predicted the utility of paraconsistent logic. He patented 
helicopter designs which anticipated by three decades the use of blade-tip jets to 
drive the rotors and which had the seeds of the centrifugal-flow gas turbine engine, 
designed a heart-beat monitor, designed and supervised the building of a 
modernist house, and sketched a proof of Euler's Theorem, subsequently completed 
by others.   He can be viewed as the first evolutionary psychologist since he 
constantly explained the necessity of the innate background and demonstrated how 
it generates behavior. He described the psychology behind the Wason test--a 
fundamental measure used in EP decades later. He noted the indeterminate nature 
of language and the game-like nature of social interaction. He described and refuted 
the notions of the mind as machine and the computational theory of mind, long 
before practical computers. He decisively laid to rest skepticism and metaphysics. 
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He showed that, far from being inscrutable, the activities of the mind lie open before 
us, a lesson few have learned since.  
 
In addition to failing to make it clear that what they are doing is descriptive 
psychology, philosophers rarely specify exactly what it is that they expect to 
contribute to this topic that other students of behavior (i.e., scientists) do not, so after 
noting W’s above remark on science envy, I will quote again from Hacker who gives 
a good start on it. 
“Traditional epistemologists want to know whether knowledge is true belief and a 
further condition …, or whether knowledge does not even imply belief ... We want 
to know when knowledge does and when it does not require justification. We need 
to be clear what is ascribed to a person when it is said that he knows something. Is 
it a distinctive mental state, an achievement, a performance, a disposition or an 
ability? Could knowing or believing that p be identical with a state of the brain? 
Why can one say ‘he believes that p, but it is not the case that p’, whereas one cannot 
say ‘I believe that p, but it is not the case that p’? Why are there ways, methods and 
means of achieving, attaining or receiving knowledge, but not belief (as opposed to 
faith)? Why can one know, but not believe who, what, which, when, whether and 
how? Why can one believe, but not know, wholeheartedly, passionately, hesitantly, 
foolishly, thoughtlessly, fanatically, dogmatically or reasonably? Why can one 
know, but not believe, something perfectly well, thoroughly or in detail? And so on 
– through many hundreds of similar questions pertaining not only to knowledge 
and belief, but also to doubt, certainty, remembering, forgetting, observing, 
noticing, recognising, attending, being aware of, being conscious of, not to mention 
the numerous verbs of perception and their cognates. What needs to be clarified if 
these questions are to be answered is the web of our epistemic concepts, the ways in 
which the various concepts hang together, the various forms of their compatibilities 
and incompatibilities, their point and purpose, their presuppositions and different 
forms of context dependency. To this venerable exercise in connective analysis, 
scientific knowledge, psychology, neuroscience and self-styled cognitive science 
can contribute nothing whatsoever.” (Passing by the naturalistic turn: on Quine’s 
cul-de-sac- p15-2005) 
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the table 
of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have constructed over the last 
few years. It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which in turn owes much 
to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form tables being used by 
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current researchers in the psychology of thinking processes which are evidenced in 
the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 
3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I offer this table as an heuristic for describing 
behavior that I find more complete and useful than any other framework I have 
seen and not as a final or complete analysis, which would have to be three 
dimensional with hundreds (at least) of arrows going in many directions with many 
(perhaps all) pathways between S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very 
distinction between S1 and S2, cognition and willing, perception and memory, 
between feeling, knowing, believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W 
demonstrated, all words are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly 
different uses (meanings or COS). Many complex charts have been published by 
scientists but I find them of minimal utility when thinking about behavior (as 
opposed to thinking about brain function). Each level of description may be useful 
in certain contexts but I find that being coarser or finer limits usefulness.  
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind (LSM), 
the Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of Thought (LST), the 
Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical Structure of Personality 
(LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DSC), the Descriptive 
Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), Intentionality-the classical 
philosophical term. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and Willing 
(Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to 
the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to 
world direction of fit” and “world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in 
the mind” and “cause originates in the world”   S1 is only upwardly causal (world 
to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or information) while S2 has 
content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). I have adopted my 
terminology in this table. 
 
I give a detailed explanation of the table in my other writings. 
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public Conditions 
of Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place (H+N, 
T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in Body No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
9 
 
FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working  
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
 Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others as 
COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while the 
automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 by 
myself). 
 
*      Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible actions 
etc. 
**          Searle’s Prior Intentions 
***        Searle’s Intention In Action 
****       Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****     Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******  (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly called this 
causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
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I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to 
the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to 
world direction of fit” and “world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in 
the mind” and “cause originates in the world”   S1 is only upwardly causal (world 
to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or information) while S2 has 
content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). I have adopted my 
terminology in this table. 
 
One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of 
language in a particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts at 
explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth.  It is critical 
to note that this table is only a highly simplified context-free heuristic and each use 
of a word must be examined in its context. The best examination of context variation 
is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, which provide numerous 
tables and charts that should be compared with this one.  
 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the 
genetically programmed automatisms from the effects of culture. All study of 
higher order behavior is an effort to tease apart not only fast S1 and slow S2 thinking 
(e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions or abilities to act), but the 
logical extensions of S2 into culture (S3). 
 
Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order S2/S3 
social behavior due to the recent evolution of genes for dispositional psychology, 
while the later W shows how it is based on true-only unconscious axioms of S1 
which evolved into conscious dispositional propositional thinking of S2. 
 
S1 is the simple automated functions of our involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, 
mirror neuron, true-only, non-propositional, pre-linguistic mental states- our 
perceptions and memories and reflexive acts including System 1 Truths and UA1 -
-Understanding of Agency 1-- and Emotions1- such as joy, love, anger) which can 
be described causally, while the evolutionarily later linguistic functions are 
expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, mentalizing 
neurons.  That is, of testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 and UA2 and 
Emotions2 (joyfulness, loving, hating) -- the dispositional (and often counterfactual) 
imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, believing, etc. which can only 
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be described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's just a fact that attempts to describe System 
2 in terms of neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, make no sense--see W, 
S, Hacker etc.). 
 
Disposition words have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar philosophical use 
(but graduating into everyday uses) which refers to the true-only sentences 
resulting from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 
psychology (`I know these are my hands')--i.e., they are Causally Self Referential 
(CSR), and the S2 use, which is their normal use as dispositions, which can be acted 
out, and which can become true or false (`I know my way home')--i.e., they have 
Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and are not CSR. 
 
The investigation of System 1 has revolutionized psychology, economics and other 
disciplines under names like "cognitive illusions", "priming", "framing", "heuristics" 
and "biases". Of course, these too are language games so there will be more and less 
useful ways to use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from "pure" 
System 1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but not of S2 only, 
since it cannot occur without involving much of the intricate S1 network of 
"cognitive modules", "inference engines", "intracerebral reflexes", "automatisms", 
"cognitive axioms", "background" or "bedrock" --as W and later S call our 
Evolutionary Psychology (EP). 
 
The deontic structures or `social glue' are the automatic fast actions of S1 producing 
the slow dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during personal 
development into a wide array of automatic universal cultural deontic relationships 
(S3). I expect this fairly well describes the basic structure of behavior. 
 
So, recognizing that S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless 
(lacking representations or information) while S2 has content and is downwardly 
causal (mind to world) (e.g., see my review of Hutto and Myin's `Radical 
Enactivism'), I would change the paragraphs from S’s MSW p39 beginning "In sum" 
and ending on pg 40 with "conditions of satisfaction" as follows. 
 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive prior intentions and actions (`will') are 
caused by the automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP as modified 
by S2 (‘free will’). We try to match how we desire things to be with how we think 
they are. We should see that belief, desire (and imagination--desires time shifted 
and decoupled from intention) and other S2 propositional dispositions of our slow 
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thinking later evolved second self, are totally dependent upon (have their COS 
originating in) the CSR rapid automatic primitive true- only reflexive S1. In 
language and neurophysiology there are intermediate or blended cases such as 
intending (prior intentions) or remembering, where the causal connection of the 
COS with S1 is time shifted, as they represent the past or the future, unlike S1 which 
is always in the present. S1 and S2 feed into each other and are often orchestrated 
seamlessly by the learned deontic cultural relations of S3, so that our normal 
experience is that we consciously control everything that we do. This vast arena of 
cognitive illusions that dominate our life Searle has described as `The 
Phenomenological Illusion’ (TPI). 
 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work contemporary psychology, that `will', 
`self' and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of S1 composed of 
perceptions and reflexes., and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of 
demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made so wonderfully clear 
numerous times, they are the basis for judgment and so cannot be judged. The true-
only axioms of our psychology are not evidential. 
 
Like Carruthers and others, S sometimes states (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that S1 (i.e., 
memories, perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., true-false) structure. As 
I have noted above, and many times in other reviews, it seems crystal clear that W 
is correct, and it is basic to understanding behavior, that only S2 is propositional 
and S1 is axiomatic and true-only. They both have COS and Directions of Fit (DOF) 
because the genetic, axiomatic intentionality of S1 generates that of S2 but if S1 were 
propositional in the same sense it would mean that skepticism is intelligible, the 
chaos that was philosophy before W would return, and in fact if true, life would not 
be possible. As W showed countless times and biology demonstrates, life must be 
based on certainty--automated unconscious rapid reactions. Organisms that always 
have a doubt and pause to reflect will die-no evolution, no people, no philosophy. 
 
I would translate S's summary of practical reason on p127 of MSW as follows: "We 
yield to our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which typically include Desire -
Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA--i.e., desires displaced in space and time), 
which produce dispositions to behavior that commonly result sooner or later in 
muscle movements that serve our inclusive fitness (increased survival for genes in 
ourselves and those closely related)." And I would restate his description on p129 
of how we carry out DIRA2/3 as "The resolution of the paradox is that the 
unconscious DIRA1 serving long term inclusive fitness generate the conscious 
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DIRA2 which often override the short term personal immediate desires." Agents do 
indeed consciously create the proximate reasons of DIRA2/3, but these are very 
restricted extensions of unconscious DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). Obama and the 
Pope wish to help the poor because it is right but the ultimate cause is a change in 
their brain chemistry that increased the inclusive fitness of their distant ancestors. 
Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive 
causal actions of S1 which often give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2 (often 
modified into the cultural extensions of S3), which produces reasons for action that 
often result in activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 causing actions. The 
general mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by changes in 
neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. The overall cognitive illusion 
(called by S `The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker `The Blank Slate' and by 
Tooby and Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') is that S2/S3 has 
generated the action consciously for reasons of which we are fully aware and in 
control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology and psychology can see that 
this view is not credible. 
 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, i.e., public 
truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When I think in language, there 
aren't `meanings' going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the 
language is itself the vehicle of thought." And, if I think with or without words, the 
thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is as there is no other possible criterion (COS). 
Thus, W's lovely aphorisms (p132 Budd) "It is in language that wish and fulfillment 
meet" and "Like everything metaphysical, the harmony between thought and 
reality is to be found in the grammar of the language." And one might note here 
that ` grammar' in W can usually be translated as ` EP' and that in spite of his frequent 
warnings against theorizing and generalizing, this is about as broad a 
characterization of higher order descriptive psychology as one can find. 
 
Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S notes 
that there is a general way to characterize the act of meaning-- "Speaker meaning... 
is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction" which 
means to speak or write a well-formed sentence in a context that can be true or false 
and this is an act and not a mental state. 
 
Hence the famous quote from W: "If God had looked into our minds he would not 
have been able to see there whom we were speaking of (PI p217)" and his comments 
that the whole problem of representation is contained in "that's Him" and "...what 
14 
 
gives the image its interpretation is the path on which it lies," or as S says its COS. 
Hence W's summation (p140 Budd) that "What it always comes to in the end is that 
without any further meaning, he calls what happened the wish that that should 
happen"..." the question whether I know what I wish before my wish is fulfilled 
cannot arise at all. And the fact that some event stops my wishing does not mean 
that it fulfills it. Perhaps I should not have been satisfied if my wish had been 
satisfied"...Suppose it were asked `Do I know what I long for before I get it? If I have 
learned to talk, then I do know."  
 
Disposition words refer to Potential Events which I accept as fulfilling the COS and 
my mental states, emotions, change of interest etc. have no bearing on the way 
dispositions function. I am hoping, wishing, expecting, thinking, intending, 
desiring etc. depending on the state I take myself to be in-- on the COS that I express 
and which can only be expressed by reflexive S1 muscle contractions, especially 
those of speech. 
 
This is another statement of W’s argument against private language. Likewise, with 
rule following and interpretation --they can only be publicly checkable acts. And 
one must note that many (most famously Kripke) miss the boat here, being misled 
by W's frequent referrals to community practice into thinking it's just arbitrary 
public practice that underlies language and social conventions. W makes clear many 
times that such conventions are only possible given an innate shared axiomatic 
psychology which he often calls the background. 
 
W’s definitive arguments against introspection and private language are as clear as 
day—we must have a test to differentiate between A and B and tests can only be 
public. He famously illustrated this with the ‘Beetle in the Box’ as noted p191 of 
WAP. I have explained the functioning of dispositional language (‘propositional 
attitudes’) and W’s dismantling of the notion of introspection above and in my 
reviews of Budd, Johnston and several of S’s books.  Basically, he showed that the 
causal relation and word and object model that works for S1 does not apply to S2. 
 
W famously rejected behaviorism and much of his work is devoted to describing 
why it cannot serve as a description of behavior. “Are you not really a behaviourist 
in disguise? Aren’t you at bottom really saying that everything except human 
behavior is a fiction? If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical fiction.” (PI 
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p307) But real behaviorism is rampant in its modern ‘functionalist’, 
‘computationalist’,’dynamic systems’ forms.  See my review of Carruthers’ ‘The 
Opacity of Mind’ for a recent egregious example.  
Behaviorism etc. have no practical impact.  Unlike other cartoon views of life, they 
are too cerebral and esoteric to be grasped by more than a tiny fringe and it is so 
unrealistic that even its adherents totally ignore it in their everyday life.  
Unfortunately, not so with other cartoon theories like the Standard Social Science 
Model, the Blank Slate and The Phenomenological Illusion, widely shared by 
religions, governments, sociology, anthropology, pop psychology, history, 
literature, and mom and dad, in spite of well-known facts, such as that personalities 
of adults adopted as children are as different from those of their adoptive siblings 
and parents as people chosen randomly off the street.  Religions big and small, 
political movements, and economics often generate or embrace already existing 
cartoons that ignore physics and biology (human nature), posit forces terrestrial or 
cosmic that reinforce our superstitions, wishful thinking and selfishness and help 
to accelerate the destruction of the earth (the real purpose of nearly every social 
practice).  The point is to realize that these fantasies are on a continuum and have 
the same source. All of us are born with a cartoon view of life and few ever grow 
out of it.  But the world is not a cartoon, so a great tragedy is being played out as 
the cartoons collide with reality. 
In spite of the fact that most of the above has been known to many for decades (and 
even ¾ of a century in the case of some of W’s teachings), I have never seen anything 
approaching an adequate discussion in behavioral science texts and commonly 
there is barely a mention.  
 
Now for some comments on “Wittgenstein and Psychology” (WAP).  
 
Many sections of the book are reasonably successful in describing W’s work but 
there is much aimless wandering and many mistakes and confusions. These will 
hopefully be obvious to those who read the above and my other reviews as I cannot 
recount more than a few of the hundreds of critical comments I made in my two 
readings of this book. A major flaw, common to most writing in the behavioral 
sciences, is the lack of awareness of the S1/S2 two-selves mode of describing 
personality that W pioneered (though nobody noticed) and a failure to be clear 
about nature/nuture issues. The fast, automatic perceptions, ‘rules’ and behaviors 
of S1 are mushed together with the slow conscious dispositional thinking, believing 
and rule following of S2 and neither are clearly or consistently distinguished from 
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the arbitrary cultural behaviors of S3.  Thus Chap 6 on Rules and Rule Following is 
severely limited by failing to note clearly the difference between the automatic 
unconscious ‘rules’ of S1 perception and reflexive actions and the deliberate 
conscious ‘rules’ of S2 thinking and understanding, both innate, and the arbitrary 
learned S3 rules that constitute the cultural veneer on behavior. S2 rule following is 
just dispositional behavior of understanding propositions with COS. Throughout 
the book they miss W’s teachings regarding the true only axiomatically based two 
systems of personality (half a century before it became popular) so beautifully laid 
out in his third period and above all in his last work On Certainty.   
 
There is a good discussion of W’s remarks on reading in Chap 5 ‘Skills and Abilities’ 
but it fails here or anywhere to make it clear that these are dispositions, hence 
propositional and true or false S2 functions and, like all dispositions, have clear 
meaning due to their public outer Conditions of Satisfaction and not to any private 
internal phenomena. This is another demonstration of the impossibility of private 
language and introspection and contrary to its supposed complexity, it is a simple 
fact that there can be no such thing as a private test to determine the truth of any 
statement. This is the major topic of the fine books by Budd and Johnston—the Inner 
phenomena that we experience and the Outer behavior that determines the 
operation of language and all social interaction.  
 
Chap 8 on Cognition is better and Chap 9 on Subjectivity and the PLA is the best in 
the book. It is critical to read p176-7 where the major issues of the rest of the book 
are summarized and answered. Chap 10 is feeble while 11 had some good material 
on intention and action but is crippled by blank slateism without any note that W 
embraced innateness and gave frequent references to our inherited background. 
Like most of the book, it cries out for close study more W examples and 
amalgamation with the powerful framework of Searle. In spite of much good 
material, I again find much to criticize in Chap 12 and 13 on Emotions and 
Perceptions—e.g. W noted that my emotions are basically S1 true only automated 
functions while my understanding of your emotions is most often an S2 exercise.  
 
Another major flaw of the book is its failure to note W’s role in destroying the 
mechanical or reductionist or computationalist view of mind. These continue to 
dominate cognitive science and philosophy in spite of the fact that they were 
powerfully countered by W and later by S and others.  
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There is much talk of W’s use of terms like “grammar”, “rules” etc., but never a 
clear mention that they mean our EP or our genetically programmed innate 
behavior.  There are references to Baker and Hackers works and to Budd, but none 
to many standard W refs such as ter Hark, Johnston, and especially to the searchable 
Intelex CDROM of his complete works, nor to Searle, and none to the vast literature 
of EP.  This is a good first attempt to bring W’s pioneering work on higher order 
thought to the attention of psychology but it has many failings and needs a 
thorough rewrite. 
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